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Abstract:  
Estimates of GDP per capita are provided on an annual basis for eight Sub-
Saharan African economies for the period since 1885. Although the growth 
experienced in most of SSA since the mid-1990s has had historical precedents, 
there have also been episodes of negative growth or “shrinking”, so that long run 
progress has been limited. Despite some heterogeneity across countries, this 
must be seen as a disappointing performance for the region as a whole, given the 
possibilities of catch-up growth. Avoiding episodes of shrinking needs to be given 
a higher priority in understanding the transition to sustained economic growth. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The field of African economic history has enjoyed a recent ‘renaissance’ based on 
newly digitized sources of data and the application of innovative techniques 
(Austin and Broadberry 2014; Fourie 2016). This work has shed new light on the 
patterns of trade, living standards, inequality and institutions of African states 
over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and in some cases for 
even earlier periods. A number of insights have emerged from this research, 
particularly about the ways in which Africans responded to changing market 
conditions and the changing role of state institutions in structuring the 
interactions of African producers with the global economy. The picture of the 
region that emerges is not one of ubiquitous stagnation, but rather of frequent 
but inconsistent periods of economic expansion (Frankema and van Waijenburg 
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2012; Frankema et al. 2018; Jerven 2010). Largely missing, however, are 
aggregate estimates of the economic performance of African countries across this 
period which would allow for more systematic comparisons across both space and 
time. For most countries, GDP per capita estimates based on contemporary data 
are available only for the period after 1950.2  
 
This paper addresses this gap by providing a quantitative overview of economic 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the long twentieth century, 
encompassing the colonial era as well as the post-independence period. This is 
done by presenting annual estimates of GDP per capita for a number of countries 
covering the major regions of southern, west, east and central Africa for the 
period 1885-2008`. Working carefully with disaggregated data, it is possible to 
reconstruct the path of economic activity for the eight economies considered here 
during the colonial era. These estimates can be linked to post-war data to 
provide an annual database covering the period 1885-2008. We then use this 
database to show that although the growth experienced in most of SSA since the 
mid-1990s does have historical precedents, it is clear that there have also been 
many episodes of negative growth or “shrinking”, so that overall progress has 
been limited.  
 
The data also show considerable heterogeneity in Africa’s growth experience 
across the different regions of the continent. In southern Africa, although the 
Cape Colony provided high living standards for a small number of European 
settlers from the eighteenth century, GDP per capita in South Africa as a whole 
was no higher than in the richest West African economies as late as 1910. South 
Africa forged ahead only with industrialization after World War I. Zimbabwe has 
experienced levels of per capita GDP on a par with the richest West African 
economies during boom periods, but has also experienced severe growth 
reversals, most recently since the late 1990s as the rest of SSA has experienced a 
                                                          
2 Estimates of GDP per capita growth during the twentieth century have been published by 
Jerven (2014b; 2018) for a couple of individual countries while Prados de la Escosura (2012) 
provides conjectural estimates for a wider sample of countries using trade data. 
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growth boom. In West Africa, Nigeria and Ghana have experienced several 
episodes of sustained shrinking, linked to declining prices for exports and 
political instability, along with episodes of growing. In East Africa, episodes of 
growing have more than outweighed episodes of shrinking in Kenya and Uganda, 
although most of the long run gain occurred before World War II. In Central 
Africa, Zambia experienced a dramatic copper boom between the 1930s and the 
1970s, but this was followed by a severe case of shrinking, which allowed Malawi 
to catch up.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the approach to the 
reconstruction of historical national accounts for the economies of South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Malawi. A data 
appendix provides further details of this exercise. Section 3 then explores the 
experience of growth in each of the economies, while section 4 places the 
experience of SSA in a wider comparative perspective. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Historical national accounting for sub-Saharan Africa 
Despite its central importance in the modern economic history of most regions, 
until recently there has been relatively little use of national accounting in the 
economic history of Africa (Manning 1987: 51). This can be seen as reflecting a 
general scepticism concerning quantitative methods amongst a generation of 
economic historians of Africa, which left the impression that there was little data 
available. Alternatively, another literature has unhelpfully exaggerated 
shortcomings in African GDP data without providing any practical remedies 
(Jerven 2013). However, recent work in African economic history has 
demonstrated the availability of large amounts of data for the colonial era, as 
well as for the period since independence (Austin and Broadberry 2014). Those 
data are used here to provide historical national accounts for a number of 
important Sub-Saharan African economies in the main regions of southern, west, 
east and central Africa. The estimates of GDP per capita derived in this way can 
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be linked up to the post-war national accounts produced during the final years of 
the colonial era and in the early years of independence. Details of the 
reconstruction of national income are provided in Appendix 1 for the colonial 
period before 1950 and Appendix 2 for the post-1950 period. The basic approach 
is set out below, providing summary information on the economies analysed: 
South Africa (and earlier the Cape Colony), Zimbabwe (formerly Southern 
Rhodesia), Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia 
(formerly Northern Rhodesia), and Malawi (formerly Nyasaland). We also 
address some of the critiques of African GDP data.  
 
It should be noted that our study covers only countries that were British 
colonies. This has a number of advantages for a study of economic growth. First, 
the underlying data were collected on a comparable basis during the colonial 
period, and the methods adopted during this era continued to influence the 
statistical offices of the independent states following decolonization. Second, our 
sample covers a large share of the GDP and population of Sub-Saharan Africa; in 
1950, these eight countries accounted for just over 50 per cent of the GDP of the 
region and just under 40 per cent of the population. Third, with two countries in 
each of southern, west, east and central Africa, our sample includes a wide 
geographic spread. However, it also means that there are large parts of the 
continent that we have not been able to cover, and it is possible that British 
colonies were on average more affluent than areas colonized by other countries 
(Burbank and Cooper 2010: 315). We hope that our efforts will inspire further 
studies to fill in these gaps. 
 
2.1 Historical national accounts for South Africa 
South Africa is the only one of the eight countries for which it is possible to draw 
on existing estimates, produced by Fourie and van Zanden (2013) for the Cape 
Colony over the period 1701-1910 and for the whole of South Africa from 1910, 
derived from a number of different sources that have been spliced together. 
Fourie and van Zanden (2013) use primary sources to estimate both population 
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and nominal GDP for the period 1701-1793, during which time the Cape Colony 
served as a victualling station for the Dutch East India Company (VOC)3. They 
use an output approach which distinguishes an agricultural sector, the VOC 
sector and the rest of the economy.  Agricultural output is estimated from data 
on wheat, wine and meat, taking account also of capital formation in agriculture 
in the form of livestock, land and vines. Output of the VOC sector consists of 
wages and salaries of company employees, augmented by income in kind and 
income from their own trading activities, plus income earned by the VOC from 
imports and exports to the Cape Colony. Output of the rest of the economy takes 
account of the slave trade, the sale of wine and other goods to visiting sailors and 
the population of Cape Town, the value adding activities of bakers and butchers, 
construction activity and the activities of other craftsmen. Nominal GDP is 
deflated using a price index constructed by de Zwart (2013).  
 
For the period 1804-1910, estimates of nominal GDP were made by Greyling et 
al. (2010) from primary material for the British Cape Colony. These were 
converted to constant price terms by Fourie and van Zanden (2013) using de 
Zwart’s (2013) price index.4 Although official data for nominal GDP and a 
consumer price index are available from the Bureau of Census and Statistics for 
the period from 1910 onwards, they have not been used by Fourie and van 
Zanden (2013) for the period 1910-1924, since they produce an implausibly large 
drop in GDP between 1910 and the mid-1920s. An alternative series of real GDP 
from Schumann (1938) has instead been used for the period 1910-1924, and 
spliced to the official series for 1924-1946. For the period since 1946, real GDP 
per capita is taken from South African Reserve Bank (2015). 
 
 
                                                          
3 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. 
4 A later version of the Greyling et al. (2010) GDP per capita series for the Cape Colony covering 
the period 1861-1909 has been published in Magee et al. (2016). Although it shows the same 
pattern of fluctuations as the old series, the new series exhibits much stronger trend growth, 
which would mean either an implausibly low level of per capita GDP in 1861, well below bare 
bones subsistence, or an implausibly high level of per capita GDP in 1909. 
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2.2 Historical national accounts for the colonial era 
For the other seven economies considered here, it has been necessary to 
reconstruct historical national accounts from primary sources. For the colonial 
era, GDP has been estimated from the output side, dividing the economy into 
four main sectors covering traditional agriculture, domestic industry and 
services, the export sector and government.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional agriculture 
It has been conventional in African economic history to assume that outside the 
modern export sector, there is a large traditional agricultural sector, where most 
people live at bare bones subsistence, eking out a living from the land. Output in 
this sector is assumed to grow in line with population, with no improvement in 
living standards over time. This view can be seen in the work of Szereszewki 
(1965), who provided estimates of GDP in Ghana for the benchmark years of 
1891, 1901 and 1911 and compared them with 1960. It is also implicit in the 
work of Deane (1953), who prepared estimates of GDP for Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in the 1940s. Furthermore, Deane went on to 
apply this approach to the estimation of agricultural output in Great Britain 
during the eighteenth century, thus making it a standard tool of early historical 
national accounting in Europe, as well as Africa (Deane and Cole 1962). In 
Europe, however, the assumption of constant per capita consumption of food over 
long periods of time has increasingly been challenged, particularly where there 
are good reasons to believe that there were significant changes in real income 
(Crafts 1976; Malanima 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013).  
 
Rather than assuming constant per capita consumption of food, output of 
traditional agriculture can be estimated from data on population and the real 
wage using an assumed income elasticity to derive the demand for food. 
Broadberry et al. (2015) have also recently applied this approach to India, and 
here it is applied to a number of African economies. Confidence in this demand 
approach has been strengthened by cross-checking against supply-side estimates 
7 
 
of agricultural output derived from data on the amount of cultivated land and 
crop yields (Allen 2005; Broadberry et al. 2015). The population data in Table 1 
are taken from Frankema and Jerven (2014b), who refine the path-breaking 
attempt by Manning (2010) to project backwards from a firm census benchmark 
in the post-war period, taking account of population growth estimates of 
countries with similar levels of development, as well as situational modifications 
informed by region-specific conditions and developments. Frankema and Jerven 
(2014a) suggest two adjustments to Manning (2010), affecting both the level of 
the 1950 benchmark and the rate of population growth before 1950. This results 
in two important modifications of Manning’s estimates. First, there is an 
upwards adjustment of the population level in 1950 by around 10 per cent, 
derived from an examination of the bias in African censuses before and after 
1950. Second, whereas Manning applied a growth rate derived from India as the 
starting point for African population growth before 1950, together with 
situational modifications, Frankema and Jerven point to tropical land-abundant 
economies in Southeast Asia as a more appropriate comparator than India for 
the tropical regions of Africa.  
 
Presented in absolute terms, the population estimates in Table 1 demonstrate 
the relative size of each economy at every point in time, as well as the growth of 
population over time. Population grew quite rapidly at around 1.1 per cent per 
annum over the period 1870-1950 in the two West African countries of Ghana 
and Nigeria, with Nigeria remaining Africa’s most populous country. Population 
growth was more modest at an annual rate of 0.6 per cent in the East African 
economies of Kenya and Uganda, and slower still in the Central African 
countries of Zambia and Malawi. The most rapid population growth during this 
period was in South Africa, at an annual rate of 1.5 per cent, making South 
Africa one of the continent’s most populous economies. Zimbabwe also shared in 
this rapid rate of population growth.  
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The real wage data in Table 2 are derived mainly from Frankema and van 
Waijenburg (2012). The nominal wages are those of unskilled urban workers, 
available from the Blue Books for the period before World War II and from other 
official sources for later years. The weights for the items in the price index are 
based on an adaptation of Allen’s (2009) subsistence basket to African 
circumstances. The cost of the basket is very heavily dependent on the price of 
grain, so that the real wage computed using this price index is close to a grain 
wage. For Zimbabwe, Mosley’s (1983) composite money wage index has been 
used. This is based on the money wages of agricultural workers and miners, 
deflated with a price index that again relies heavily on grain, but combined with 
import prices for products that featured heavily in the consumption basket of 
African workers. The real wage trended upwards in all countries, but there was 
also a high degree of volatility, with alternating periods of positive and negative 
growth.  
 
These trends in population and real wages are converted into the output of 
traditional agriculture via a demand for food function. The approach can be 
traced back at least as far as Crafts (1985) and was developed further by Allen 
(2000) using consumer theory. Allen (2000: 13-14) starts with the identity: 
rcNQ A =          (1) 
where QA is real agricultural output, r is the ratio of production to consumption, 
c is consumption per head and N is population. Real agricultural consumption 
per head is assumed to be a function of its own price in real terms (PA/P), the 
price of non-agricultural goods and services in real terms (PNA/P), and real 
income per head (y). Assuming a log-linear specification: 
 yPPPPc NAA ln)/ln()/ln(ln 210 βααα +++=     (2) 
where α1 and α2 are the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand, β is the 
income elasticity of demand and α0 is a constant. Consumer theory requires that 
the own-price, cross-price and income elasticities should sum to zero, which sets 
tight constraints on the plausible values, particularly given the accumulated 
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evidence on elasticities in developing countries (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980: 
15-16, 60-82). 
 
For early modern Europe, Allen (2000: 14) works with an own-price elasticity of -
0.6 and a cross-price elasticity of 0.1, which constrains the income elasticity to be 
0.5. Allen assumes that agricultural consumption is equal to agricultural 
production, an assumption which has also been followed here for traditional 
agriculture, which produced the basic grains for domestic consumption. Although 
there were significant exports of food crops, these are accounted for separately in 
the export sector. Following Broadberry et al. (2015), a restricted version can be 
implemented using the grain wage (the daily wage divided by the cost of the 
subsistence basket) for unskilled urban labourers and an assumed income 
elasticity of 0.5. One way to justify this would be if the cross-price elasticity is 
zero and real income is the wage divided by the overall price level. The own-price 
elasticity must then equal the negative of the real wage elasticity. But then the 
overall price level used to deflate the wage cancels out with the overall price 
level used to deflate the grain price, leaving a single term in the grain wage.5  
 
2.2.2 Domestic industry and services 
The series for domestic industry and services is derived using a similar demand 
approach to that used for traditional agriculture. However, in this case, an 
explicit allowance can be made for imports. Also, the income elasticity of demand 
for industrial goods and services is assumed to be higher than for food, in line 
with Engel’s Law (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980: 193). Here, the income elasticity 
has been set to unity, which leaves room for an income elasticity of demand for 
imported goods greater than one. It should also be noted that the income 
elasticity of demand for services is normally higher than for industrial goods. 
The nominal value of per capita consumption of industrial goods and services 
thus moves in line with wages, and the total nominal demand for industrial 
                                                          
5 For all the African economies considered here, the overall price index is very heavily dominated 
by the grain price, making the path of the grain wage very similar to the path of the real 
consumption wage, and also making it difficult to put much faith in any allowance for a cross-
price elasticity effect. 
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goods and services is obtained by multiplying per capita nominal consumption by 
the population. However, to obtain the value of domestic production of industrial 
goods and services, it is necessary to subtract the value of imports. The nominal 
value of domestic production can then be obtained in constant prices using the 
general price deflator for each country from Frankema and van Waijenburg 
(2012).  
 
2.2.3 The export sector 
The data on production for the export sector are much more abundant than for 
traditional agriculture or domestic industry and services, where participation in 
the market was more limited. Table 3 sets out indices of export volumes for each 
country, constructed with weights for three or four benchmark years. The 
weights for 1950, based on export value shares, are shown in Table 4 and 
indicate a high degree of specialization. In West Africa, Ghana focused 
increasingly on cocoa and gold as the previously dominant exports of palm 
products and rubber declined, while Nigeria specialized in palm products and 
groundnuts as well as cocoa. In East Africa, Kenya focused on coffee, tea and 
sisal, while Uganda specialized in cotton and coffee. In Central Africa, Zambia’s 
key exports were blister copper from the 1920s and electrolytic copper from 
the1930s, while Malawi developed a specialization in tobacco and tea. Exports 
grew very rapidly in all these countries, but the upward trend was stronger in 
East Africa than in West Africa, and stronger still in Central Africa.  
 
2.2.4 Government 
The government sector is measured by nominal government expenditure deflated 
by Feinstein’s (1972) price index for UK public authorities’ goods and services, 
which is often used in the African economic history literature (Gardner 2012; 
Jerven 2014b). One rationale for this would be that much of the expenditure was 
on civil servants, whose salaries were set in London, and stores purchased in 
Britain. In practice, however, since Feinstein’s UK government deflator is highly 
correlated with the local price indices used to calculate real wages, its use makes 
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little difference to the overall trend. Comparing Table 5 with Table 3, it is clear 
that in each country, real government expenditure grew very rapidly in line with 
the growth of the export sector, thus outstripping the growth of traditional 
agriculture and domestic industry and services by a large margin. Compared 
with the export sector, however, government was much less volatile than 
exports, thus acting as a stabilising force. Because the colonial administration 
tried to maintain budget balance, this indicates the stability of revenue over the 
international business cycle and difficulties in cutting expenditure during 
downturns (Gardner 2012). 
 
2.2.5 Economic structure and the path of GDP 
To calculate GDP, it is necessary to apply an appropriate weighting scheme to 
the production series for traditional agriculture, domestic industry and services, 
the export sector and government. Sectoral value added weights for all the 
economies considered here, circa 1950, are shown in Table 6, derived from early 
national accounting sources. In all cases, this involved rearranging information 
on sub-sectors, relying particularly on distinctions made by early national 
accounting statisticians between domestic and export agriculture and classifying 
mining as an export sector.  
 
As noted earlier, the export and government sectors grew much more rapidly 
than traditional agriculture and domestic industry and services. However, the 
export and government sectors still accounted for a relatively small share of GDP 
by 1950, which means that the trend in aggregate GDP was driven largely by the 
slower growing sectors. However, the much greater volatility of the export sector, 
which was subject to sharp booms and busts, meant that short run fluctuations 
in GDP tended to be driven by the export sector.  
 
2.3. National accounts for the post-1950 period 
In this paper, we link our new estimates of pre-1950 GDP per capita to the early 
national accounting series begun in the final years of the colonial period, and 
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built on by newly independent governments in the post-colonial period. It has 
long been common for economists to point to shortcomings in these national 
accounts produced by African statistical offices (Samuels 1963; Lury 1964). More 
recently, however, Jerven (2013; 2014a) has argued stridently that the errors are 
so large that they systematically distort the picture of African growth and cannot 
be used to support the common perception of poor economic performance in 
Africa since World War II. Since these data form the basis of the post-1950 GDP 
per capita estimates used in this study, a consideration of Jerven’s arguments is 
called for. A number of points can be made to suggest that Jerven overstates his 
case. 
 
First, many of the issues raised by Jerven concerning the calculation of a GDP 
series for a particular country are not unique to Africa, and apply equally to 
other regions. It is therefore not so clear that they seriously distort the 
comparative picture. For example, the distortions arising from the rebasing and 
splicing of national accounts, widely discussed for the case of Nigeria, are 
analysed by Prados de la Escosura (2016) for the case of Spain. Second, Jerven 
(2014a) particularly focuses on disagreements between GDP series reported by 
different international datasets, taken from national statistical offices (official 
series), the Maddison dataset, the Penn World Table (PWT) and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). However, the differences in long 
run trends reported by these agencies are much smaller than the differences in 
annual growth rates that Jerven emphasizes. Also, the different agencies agree 
closely on country rankings of performances over the medium run, as can be seen 
clearly in Table 7. Indeed, as van Waijenburg (2014: 302) notes, the correlation 
coefficients of relative rankings of countries across the various datasets are 
higher for Africa than for Asia, and are not uniformly lower than for Latin 
America or even for Western countries. As always, criticism of data quality needs 
to be accompanied by a careful assessment of the purposes for which the data are 
being used. If the question concerns the performance of African economies over 
periods of more than a year or two and if account is taken of levels and growth 
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rates together, then Jerven’s bleak assessment of the state of post-colonial 
African national accounts loses much of its force.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that although Jerven (2013; 2014a) provides no 
alternative series to GDP per capita, other authors have responded to the 
allegations of an African “statistical tragedy” by suggesting the use of other data 
to track African economic growth in recent decades (Deverajan 2013). Henderson 
et al. (2011) suggest using satellite maps of lights at night, but they find that the 
GDP per capita data neither overstate nor understate economic growth 
consistently. Although Young (2012) claims that indices of asset ownership from 
the World Bank’s Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) have grown much 
more rapidly than GDP per capita in African countries in recent years, Harttgen 
et al. (2013) find no evidence of a recent African growth miracle beyond that 
which is visible in the GDP per capita data, once account is taken of the 
weakness of the relationship between growth in assets and growth in income. 
 
Given the importance of the issue, a decision was nevertheless taken to go back 
to the original national accounting sources for the post-1950 period and examine 
the scale of the disagreements with the Maddison (2010) series. The results are 
shown in Appendix 2 in Figure A2.1, labelled as “official series” and plotted 
together with the Maddison (2010) series. In all cases, the two series agree very 
closely over the long run, and in most cases the agreement is also close even over 
the short run. There is certainly nothing in the case of these countries, at least, 
to warrant Jerven’s suggestion of a major disagreement between Maddison and 
the official series over the long run growth performance of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
3. Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa 
The estimates of GDP and population from the colonial and post-independence 
periods can be put together to construct a quantitative analysis of economic 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1885. As the figures above show, patterns of 
14 
 
growing and shrinking were in most countries tied tightly to foreign trade and 
the market for exports. However, the timing and scale of growth in export 
production varied both between and within countries owing to a range of factors, 
from local endowments to transport costs and political institutions (Tosh 1980; 
Frankema et al., 2018). A regional approach is adopted here, beginning with 
southern Africa, which contains the only large Sub-Saharan African economy to 
have had a relatively high level of GDP per capita throughout the period since 
1885, South Africa. South Africa is compared with Zimbabwe and then used as a 
benchmark in other regional comparisons involving West Africa (Ghana and 
Nigeria), East Africa (Kenya and Uganda) and Central Africa (Zambia and 
Malawi). 
 
3.1 Southern Africa 
GDP per capita in the Cape Colony between 1701 and 1910 and in South Africa 
since 1910 are shown in Figure 1. Fourie and van Zanden (2013) suggest that, as 
a slave society, the Cape Colony provided high living standards for a small 
number of European settlers in the eighteenth century. The settlement began as 
a victualling station for VOC ships making their way around the southern tip of 
Africa. As it grew larger, settlers produced wool and wine for export, although 
high transport costs meant that the market for these commodities was limited. 
Agricultural productivity declined as population grew, leading to an overall 
downward trend in GDP per capita from the 1770s. The view that living 
standards were relatively high for the settler community during the eighteenth 
century runs counter to the traditional view, based largely on qualitative 
sources, that the Cape Colony was an economic and social backwater before the 
mineral boom of the late nineteenth century (Feinstein 2005: 2-3). However, the 
revisionist view is now underpinned by solid quantitative evidence on real wages 
and probate inventories (de Zwart 2013; Fourie 2013). 
 
A major shift in the GDP per capita of the Cape Colony came with the discovery 
of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 (Greyling and Verhoef 2015: 10). While the 
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gold mines were not actually located in the Cape Colony, the transport of mining 
equipment to the mines and gold from the mines to the coast prompted an influx 
of capital which constructed one of the densest railway networks on the 
continent (Gwaindepi 2018; Herranz-Loncan and Fourie 2018). The economy 
suffered a shock in the first years of the twentieth centuries with the South 
African War (1899-1902), but resumed its growth ahead of the union with the 
other constituent territories of what became South Africa in 1910.  
 
From 1910, estimates of GDP per capita are available for the whole of South 
Africa. With a GDP per capita in 1910 of $1,051, living standards in the Union of 
South Africa were substantially lower than in the Cape Colony, where per capita 
GDP was $1,500 (Fourie and van Zanden 2013: 490). Low living standards for 
the majority population were underpinned by discriminatory policies which both 
reserved the good agricultural land for the settler community and created 
landless labourers with no alternative but to work for the white farmers at low 
wages (Feinstein 2005: 43-46). After a pause across World War I, South African 
growth picked up during the 1920s, driven at least partly by the rapid growth of 
the manufacturing sector. The process of industrialization was pursued behind 
tariff barriers, as a deliberate policy aimed at providing employment for poor 
white workers (Feinstein 2005: 116-121). Industrial expansion was interrupted 
by the Great Depression, with industrial output and GDP per capita falling 
during 1931-32, as South Africa remained on the gold standard for fifteen 
months after Britain’s departure from gold in September 1931 (Fourie and van 
Zanden 2013: 490). However, growth soon resumed following South Africa’s 
departure from gold in December 1932.  
 
South Africa continued to enjoy a long boom during and after World War II, 
although in contrast to the period 1913-1950, GDP per capita was now growing 
more slowly in South Africa than in most of the world outside Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Feinstein 2005: 7). This was followed by a phase of absolute shrinking 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, during which the system of apartheid 
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began to unravel. Following a transition to majority rule in 1994, growth 
returned to South Africa, which by 2008 had attained a GDP per capita 
approaching $5,000 in 1990 international prices. 
 
Figure 2 shows the path of GDP per capita in Zimbabwe in comparison with 
South Africa. Like South Africa, Zimbabwe’s early growth was linked to mineral 
exports, particularly gold. Gold was not a new discovery in Mashonaland as it 
was in the Transvaal; rather, it had been traded for centuries to the East African 
coast, fuelling the growth of Great Zimbabwe, one of medieval Africa’s largest 
cities (Iliffe 1995: 101-102; Kea 2015: 258-259). That same gold, along with the 
prospect of copper to the north, was what had attracted Cecil Rhodes’ British 
South Africa Company to the region in the late nineteenth century. Rhodes had 
built a fortune in the Kimberley diamond mines and in 1889 his company 
received a charter to administer what would become the two Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland (Flint 1974; Gardner, 2012: 23). Southern Rhodesia’s gold mines were 
not as prolific or as profitable as the Transvaal mines, and revenues generated 
were less than the cost of administering these territories. In 1924 the Company 
ceded its administrative control to the British government, and a colonial 
administration dominated by white settlers recruited in previous decades was 
granted something close to the self-governance of the Dominions, thus setting it 
apart in British Africa for its degree of autonomy within the colonial state.  
 
The BSA Company’s encouragement of European settlement was part of an 
effort to build alternative export industries. Tobacco became the most important 
export crop produced by settler farms, growing rapidly through the interwar 
period, although it came to dominate exports of gold only after World War II 
(Frankema et al. 2016: 253-256). With the stagnation of the gold mining industry 
and the comparatively slow growth of other sectors, Southern Rhodesia fell 
further behind South Africa between 1914 and 1945, with GDP per capita 
declining in absolute terms across World War I and again across World War II. A 
period of post-war growth lasted until the mid-1970s, though it was punctuated 
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by the instability which accompanied the breakup of the Central African 
Federation and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Ian Smith 
government. Despite the optimism which came with the achievement of 
independence in 1980, this period was characterized by economic stagnation 
until the mid-1990s. Finally, as most of SSA boomed from the mid-1990s, 
Zimbabwe suffered a further period of negative growth as internal conflict 
worsened under the increasingly autocratic Mugabe regime (Mlambo 2014; 
Nugent 2004: 291-294). The postwar period has therefore seen a widening of the 
gap between Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
 
3.2 West Africa 
As noted earlier, the two West African countries in our sample had levels of GDP 
per capita comparable to those of the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century, 
based on exports of palm products and rubber, in the case of Nigeria, and gold in 
Ghana, known as the Gold Coast during the colonial period. Historically, this 
region led Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of both trade and commercialization in 
the nineteenth century and before, with comparatively high levels of population 
density and substantial centralized states (Frankema 2015: 277). The region had 
also been a leader in the production of export crops, beginning with the rapid 
expansion of palm products in the nineteenth century (Law 1995). This was 
particularly true in coastal areas, which could build on both the commercial 
networks of the slave trade and the supply of slave labor to expand their export 
of cash crops.  Both Nigeria and Ghana were able to do this during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when they grew from relatively low 
levels of trade to join the ranks of the top exporters in the British Empire. Figure 
3 suggests that Nigeria and Ghana have vied with each other for per capita 
income leadership in West Africa throughout the period since 1885. 
 
Havinden and Meredith (1993: 99) note that the value of Nigeria’s exports more 
than tripled over the period 1900-1914. This was during a period when the 
process of colonial conquest was still ongoing, with outbreaks of unrest 
18 
 
particularly in the north. However, the same period also saw the extension of the 
railway from the main port at Lagos into Northern Nigeria, reaching Jebba on 
the Niger River in 1909 and Kano in 1911 (Chaves et al. 2014: 329). Though the 
railway network remained relatively ‘dendritic’, in the words of Ralph Austen, 
‘emanating from the outlets of international trade to the various regions of the 
African interior but not linking the latter to one another’, construction before 
World War I dramatically enlarged the potential for profitable production of cash 
crops by reducing transport costs and making new areas of production accessible 
(Austen 1987: 127). For Nigeria in particular, the extension of the railway 
network to the north allowed for the expansion of the groundnut industry, which 
increasingly became one of the country’s most important exports (Hogendorn 
1978; Salau 2010).  
 
Despite Nigeria’s growth, Ghana forged ahead during World War I and remained 
richer between the 1920s and the 1970s. As in Southern Rhodesia, the 
foundation of Ghana’s economic success during this period was not gold but 
agricultural produce, in this case cocoa, an imported crop which became Ghana’s 
primary export product with astonishing speed. Gareth Austin (2014: 1035) 
notes that ‘Ghana exported no cocoa beans in 1892, yet 19 years later, at 40,000 
tonnes a year, it became the world’s largest exporter’. It was introduced to 
Nigeria and Ghana by African entrepreneurs, many of whom had been involved 
in the palm oil trades previously. Indigenous farmers took up the crop, balancing 
it with food production.  
 
Cocoa thus fuelled one of the most successful expansions in export production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but it was not immune to many of the vulnerabilities 
associated with dependence on a single crop. Volatility in the cocoa price 
beginning in World War I caused significant hardship for producers who had 
invested in cocoa trees during periods of high prices, and was also behind the 
long-term stagnation in Ghana’s GDP which persisted from around 1930 through 
the 1970s (Austin, 1988). The colonial government’s response to demands for 
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price stabilization was to establish a marketing board, which purchased cocoa at 
fixed prices. This established a precedent for extensive state intervention in the 
economy, which persisted and expanded through the transition to independence 
under Kwame Nkrumah. Robert Bates (1981: ch.1) argues that the post-
independence use of the same marketing boards as a method of taxing rural 
producers to serve urban interests hindered growth in the agricultural sector 
during the first decades of independence. Nkrumah’s overthrow in a coup in 1966 
was followed by a period of political instability, with alternating military and 
civilian government up to the adoption of a new constitution in 1981 (Nugent, 
2004: 175-178) . It was not until 1984 that Ghana’s economy began to grow 
again, which it continued to do through the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
While Ghana was enduring its long period of relative stagnation, Nigeria’s 
economy was growing, unevenly but positively, due to expansions in both 
agricultural output and tin mining. There was a sharp but temporary drop in 
GDP per capita during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70). The immediate cause of 
the war was the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria, but it reflected 
regional and ethnic tensions with roots in the colonial period, as well as conflict 
over control of the country’s oil reserves (Achebe 2012; Osaghae 1998: 1-12). Oil 
production in the 1970s transformed the structure of Nigeria’s economy, as well 
as increasing per capita GDP, and by the end of the decade both agriculture and 
mining comprised only a small share of total output (Teal 1988: 72) 
 
Both Nigeria and Ghana ended up with per capita GDP slightly above $1,500 by 
2008. This represented a modest average increase for both economies over the 
long run at an annual rate of around 0.7 per cent. Relative to South Africa, 
however, this slow rate of trend growth represented a substantial decline in the 
comparative position of the region. Splicing the Cape Colony data to the South 
African data for 1910 and projecting backwards, suggests that South Africa as a 
whole had not yet forged decisively ahead of Ghana and Nigeria by 1885, on the 
eve of the gold boom. Also, as a result of the volatility of GDP per capita in all 
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three economies, a clear gap between these West African countries and South 
Africa only opened up in the mid-1930s. Indeed, both Ghana and Nigeria had 
higher per capita GDP than South Africa in 1900 during the South African War, 
while Ghana again edged ahead of South Africa in 1931-1932 during the Great 
Depression.  
 
3.3 East Africa 
Kenya and Uganda were both very poor in the early years of the twentieth 
century, as can be seen in Figure 4. East Africa had a long history of engagement 
with the Indian Ocean trade, which linked trading enclaves on the coast with 
rural hinterlands (Alpers 2009). In the interior, as well, there were centres of 
exchange and manufacture, such as salt mines or textile production (Barrett-
Gaines 2004; Clarence-Smith 2014; Frederick 2017). Ivory and cloves became 
important exports, operating alongside the slave trade which continued through 
much of the nineteenth century. However, large-scale commercialization and 
expansion of trade with Europe occurred later than in West Africa (Frankema et 
al. 2018: 238). In 1911, GDP per capita measured in 1990 international dollars 
was $449 in Kenya and $441 in Uganda, not far above bare bones subsistence. 
 
As in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, export growth in Kenya and Uganda led to an 
increase in living standards during the interwar period, but the path of per 
capita GDP was far from smooth. The construction of the Uganda Railway 
between 1896 and 1901 changed the economic landscape of East Africa (Jedwab 
et al. 2017). The railway connected Lake Victoria in Uganda to Mombasa 
through Kenya, making possible the export of cash crops from regions previously 
only accessible by caravan or head porterage. Uganda, in particular, experienced 
a massive increase in exports of cotton, the farming of which was often paired 
with banana production to ensure the efficient utilization of scarce labour (de 
Haas 2017: 606). However, there were periods of bust as well as boom, with 
Uganda suffering a particularly severe growth reversal during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s.  
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Kenya’s exports expanded less dramatically, but comprised a greater diversity of 
crops, including coffee, tea, maize and sisal. This diversity partly explains why 
the Great Depression had less of an impact on Kenya than on Uganda. Kenya’s 
economy was also shaped by imperial politics and its position in the regional 
economy. Kenya formed a customs union with Uganda and, from 1927, 
Tanganyika as well. From the 1920s Kenyan settlers were pressing for the 
imposition of protectionist tariffs on lightly processed manufactured goods. These 
pressures followed some of the same trends as in South Africa, though on a 
smaller scale. The 1923 Tariff Act helped foster the production of beer, 
cigarettes, soap, cement and canned fruit and vegetables, which gave Kenya an 
early lead in the region in terms of manufacturing production (Gardner 2012: 79; 
van Zwanenberg and King 1975: 125).  
 
Political instability was another source of vulnerability for both economies. After 
remaining relatively stable during the 1930s and World War II, Kenya’s GDP per 
capita declined sharply during the Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s. After that, it 
enjoyed relatively steady growth through the 1990s, but suffered setbacks due to 
disputed elections in the twenty-first century (Cheeseman et al. 2014: 2). Uganda 
experienced a catastrophic growth reversal during Idi Amin’s presidency 
between 1971 and 1979, though it is worth noting that rural incomes had begun 
to lag even before Amin came to power, and continued to stagnate in the period 
of political instability that followed the end of Amin’s erratic dictatorship (de 
Haas 2017: 607). Uganda recovered from the mid-1990s to reach a per capita 
GDP of just over $1,000 by 2008, more or less on a par with Kenya. Both Kenya 
and Uganda already lagged a long way behind South Africa on the eve of World 
War I, and have since fallen further behind. 
 
3.4 Central Africa 
Figure 5 plots GDP per capita in Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi 
(Nyasaland) since the early twentieth century. Both countries were even poorer 
than Kenya and Uganda on the eve of World War I, with per capita GDP in 1913, 
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measured in 1990 international dollars, at $367 in Zambia and $315 in Malawi, 
right at the level of bare bones subsistence. In the pre-colonial period, both were 
relatively remote from coastal outlets, raising the costs of exports which in the 
late nineteenth century mainly included ivory and cattle (Gardner 2012: 22).  
 
Despite this, the two countries differed substantially from one another in the 
precolonial period. With its comparatively fertile land, and reliable supplies of 
water and fish, Malawi supported a comparatively dense population in the 
nineteenth century and previously. However, the beginning of colonial rule also 
marked the end of a long period of upheaval and instability in the region, from 
the migration of refugees out of southern Africa to the late but severe impact of 
the slave trade. Agriculture in the region was also subject to significant 
fluctuations in rainfall and the level of the lakes. (McCracken 2012: 7-9). The 
impact of these environmental and human factors was exacerbated by the 
particularly heavy burden placed on Malawi by World War I, through the 
requisition of manpower as soldiers and, more prominently, porters (McCracken 
2012: 151). This, along with trade disruption, helps to explain the decline in 
Malawi’s GDP per capita across World War I.  
 
From the late 1920s, Zambia diverged from Malawi with the opening of the 
copper mines that would define its economic future. Copper deposits had long 
been known in the region, and copper production from the neighbouring region of 
Katanga in the Belgian Congo grew rapidly from 1912. It was not until 
technological developments of the 1920s, which allowed for the economical 
processing of the copper ores in Zambia, that the first copper mine was opened in 
1928 (Juif and Frankema 2018: 317). While the industry endured a somewhat 
shaky start with the collapse in copper prices in the 1930s, which resulted in the 
temporary closure of some of the newly opened mines, it then experienced a long 
boom which contributed to a rise in GDP per capita from the 1930s to the 1960s 
(Gardner 2012).  
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This growth was highly dependent on the copper price. When Northern Rhodesia 
became independent Zambia in 1964, copper comprised some 90 per cent of its 
total export values (Juif and Frankema 2018: 315). In turn, the copper mines 
were a crucial market for agricultural producers in both Zambia and, before 
1964, Zimbabwe. Close regional links within British Central Africa, culminating 
in the establishment of the short-lived Central African Federation in 1953, tied 
not just Zambia’s economy to the fate of the Copperbelt. After independence, in 
an effort to gain control over copper revenues, the Zambian government under 
Kenneth Kaunda nationalized the mines. Unfortunately, the nationalization was 
followed by a period of sustained shrinking during the 1970s and 1980s as the 
copper boom faded. This had severe consequences not just for the government 
treasury but also had spillover effects into other sectors that had come to rely on 
demand from the mines and their workers (Ferguson 1999: 7-12)  
 
Malawi also experienced a boom during the 1930s, based on tobacco and tea, but 
the relatively small export sector was unable to overcome the dominant effects of 
a weak domestic economy. Even after the construction of railway links to the 
coast, the cost of exporting from Malawi remained high. In the 1930s, one 
calculation suggested that sending tea to the closest port (Beira in Mozambique) 
cost four times more than in India (Bolt and Green, 2015: 223).  Further, 
environmental fragility continued to have an economic impact in Malawi, with 
the drying up of Lake Chilwa in the 1930s (Nagoli et al. 2017). A more 
interventionist approach to colonial development was adopted under the 
administration of Sir Geoffrey Colby in March 1948, and there was renewed 
growth in Malawi between the 1950s and the 1970s (McCracken 2012: 238). This 
was followed by less shrinking than in Zambia, so that Malawi had almost 
caught up with Zambia by 2008. Both economies remained poor, however, with 
GDP per capita just $750 in Malawi and $850 in Zambia in 2008, measured in 
1990 international dollars. Both Zambia and Malawi fell further behind South 
Africa over the period as a whole, although Zambia did briefly narrow the gap 
during the 1950s. 
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4. Sub-Saharan Africa in a wider comparative perspective 
So far, the paper has focused on comparisons within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, it is also instructive to examine how the region performed relative to 
the rest of the world. The natural comparator is the United Kingdom, since all 
the economies here were British colonies, and British accounting methods 
strongly influenced the statistical office that collected the data that have been 
used in the reconstruction of the historical national accounts. Also, since the 
United Kingdom was the world’s leading economy in the late nineteenth century 
but was subsequently overtaken by many other Western economies, this does not 
set too stringent a benchmark against which to measure Sub-Saharan African 
economic performance over this period. 
 
4.1 Anglo-African comparisons 
Figure 6 charts the level of GDP per capita in three leading African economies as 
a percentage of the UK level. South Africa succeeded in closing the per capita 
GDP gap with the United Kingdom substantially from under 20 per cent in the 
1880s to over 35 per cent by the 1950s, but the catching-up process then stalled 
until the 1970s, before going decisively into reverse during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although there are signs of a return to catching up in the 2000s, the level of GDP 
per capita in 2008 was only just about back to 20 per cent of the UK level, where 
it had been in the 1880s. The long run comparative position was even more 
disappointing in Nigeria and Kenya, where the gap with UK GDP per capita 
increased substantially over the twentieth century.  
 
4.2 Growing and shrinking 
An important factor behind the disappointing long run economic performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa during the twentieth century has been the continued 
importance of shrinking or negative economic growth. Not only have African 
economies typically experienced much higher rates of shrinking when they 
experience negative economic growth, but they have also tended to shrink more 
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frequently than developed economies such as the United Kingdom. Here, we 
apply the analysis of Broadberry and Wallis (2017) to the eight Sub-Saharan 
African economies and the United Kingdom to shed light on this issue.  
 
Broadberry and Wallis (2017) make use of an identity for establishing the 
contributions of growing and shrinking to long run economic performance, which 
can be measured by the rate of change of per capita GDP over a number of years. 
Economic performance over the long run is the aggregation of short run changes 
measured annually. Long run economic performance, g, is a combination of four 
factors: first, the frequency with which an economy grows, f(+); second, the rate 
at which it grows when growing, or the growing rate, g(+); third, the frequency 
with which an economy shrinks, f(-); and fourth,  the (negative) rate at which it 
grows when shrinking, or the shrinking rate g(-). Thus: 
 
g = {f(+) g(+)} + {f(-) g(-)}        (3) 
Since the frequency of growing is equal to one minus the frequency of shrinking, 
equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
g = {[1-f(-)] g(+)} + {f(-) g(-)}       (4) 
which reduces the number of independent factors to three. We can use this 
identity to decompose long run economic performance into shrinking and 
growing components. 
 
The first point to note in Table 8 is that when African economies have 
experienced positive growth, they have typically grown faster than the United 
Kingdom in all periods for which we have continuous data. During 1885-1910 
and 1926-1938, all the African economies for which we have data experienced 
much more rapid growing rates than the United Kingdom. For most African 
economies this continued to be the case after 1950, with only South Africa 
experiencing slower average growing than the UK during 1950-1980, and 5 of 
the 8 African economies experiencing faster growing than the UK during 1980-
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2008. Second, however, rates of growing and rates of shrinking tended to move 
together, so that high rates of growing were accompanied by high rates of 
shrinking and low rates of growing were accompanied by low rates of shrinking. 
This meant that although most African economies in most periods grew faster 
than the United Kingdom, they also shrank more rapidly. 
 
Turning to Table 9, we see a third significant finding: despite experiencing faster 
rates of growing, most African economies typically experienced positive growth 
in fewer years than the United Kingdom. Whereas the United Kingdom shrank 
in just 17 per cent of years in 1926-1938 and 1950-1980, falling to 11 per cent of 
years between 1980 and 2002, most African economies continued to shrink in a 
much higher proportion of years throughout the period. As a result, the long run 
economic performance of most African economies in all years, which can be seen 
in Table 10, was disappointing across all four sub-periods. This was the case 
even compared with the United Kingdom, which was far from a stellar performer 
over this period. The problem was that although the African economies grew at 
least as rapidly as the United Kingdom when they were growing, they 
experienced more years of shrinking with higher rates of negative growth. Hence 
even if the contribution of growing (the frequency of growing multiplied by the 
rate of growing) was greater than in the United Kingdom, this was typically 
offset by an even greater contribution of shrinking (the frequency of shrinking 
multiplied by the rate of shrinking). 
 
This has important implications for understanding the transition to sustained 
economic growth, which has still not been securely achieved in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa. First, the pattern of growing and shrinking in African economies 
in the long twentieth century has much in common with the experience of 
European economies in the pre-modern period, when growing and shrinking 
occurred in roughly equal proportions of years and average rates of both growing 
and shrinking were often of the order of 5 to 10 per cent per annum (Broadberry 
and Wallis 2017). Second, only in the nineteenth century did the frequency of 
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growing in Europe rise to about two-thirds of years, and only after World War II 
to around 85 per cent. Third, prosperity came about in Europe without an 
increase in the rate of growing. Rather, the increase in the frequency of growing, 
or reduction in the frequency of shrinking, was accompanied by a sharp fall in 
the rate of growing, but accompanied by an even bigger fall in the rate of 
shrinking. Perhaps long run performance in Africa would be improved with a 
shift of priority towards reducing the rate and frequency of shrinking rather 
than to increasing the rate of growing.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that, despite doubts expressed about the quality of African 
data which have hindered such research in the past, it is possible to construct 
GDP per capita for countries in all major regions of the continent, based on 
primary sources, dating back to the nineteenth century. The method proposed 
here can also be extended to other countries for which data are available to build 
a more comprehensive picture of African economic performance across the 
colonial and post-independence periods. This allows African countries to be 
compared not only to each other but to others around the world.  
 
The construction of GDP per capita series for eight African countries across the 
long twentieth century overturns some existing hypotheses in African economic 
history while giving others a stronger empirical foundation. For example, they 
show that South Africa’s exceptional position within the Sub-Saharan region is 
of relatively recent making. It was not until well into the twentieth century that 
it overtook coastal West Africa, for example. They also illustrate how close the 
relationship between export growth and economic growth has been for many 
countries dating back to the late nineteenth century. This could be both positive 
and negative: rising prices and demand for African commodities could lead to 
periods of relatively rapid growth, but this growth was vulnerable to changing 
global conditions, as both Ghana and Zambia learned to their cost.   
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Periods of stagnation or shrinking were also exacerbated by political instability. 
The South African War (1899-1902), the Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s, and the 
Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) all coincided with sharp declines in the level of 
GDP per capita. Though levels often recovered relatively rapidly after these 
declines, these were years in which these economies were not growing, and this 
limited the overall increase in levels of per capita income across this period.  
 
These data allow for the contextualization of the recent period of growth which 
began for most countries in the middle of the 1990s. They show that the growth 
experienced during the past two decades is not unprecedented in African history. 
Rather, most countries have experienced equivalent periods of rapid growth 
before. To know whether this growth provides a path to convergence, however, 
requires understanding the extent to which there are still risks of the shrinking 
which has undermined economic progress in the past. Assessing those risks is 
beyond the scope of this paper, and there remain debates about whether the 
changes undergone by many African economies during this period are sufficient 
to shift towards a path of sustained growth (Frankema and van Waijenburg 
2018; Harchaoui and Ungor 2018). A longer term perspective also suggests that 
reducing such sources of risk should perhaps be a greater focus for policy-makers 
and aid agencies, rather than increasing the rate of growth during boom periods 
(see, e.g, African Development Bank 2019).  
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Table 1: Population of African countries, 1870-1950 (millions) 
 
 S. 
Africa 
Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1870 3.7 0.8 2.2 14.7 3.8 3.2 1.6 2.1 
1880 4.1 0.9 2.4 15.5 4,1 3,4 1.6 2.1 
1890 4.5 1.0 2.6 16.5 4.3 3.5 1.7 2.1 
1900 5.0 1.1 2.8 17.4 4.1 3.5 1.7 2.0 
1910 5.9 1.3 3.1 19.1 3.8 3.2 1.6 1.9 
1920 6.8 1.5 3.3 20.9 3.7 3.2 1.5 1.8 
1930 8.4 1.9 3.8 24.5 4.4 3.8 1.8 2.1 
1940 10.3 2.3 4.4 28.4 5.1 4.3 2.0 2.4 
1950 12.4 2.7 5.2 34.0 6.1 5.2 2.4 2.9 
 
Sources: Frankema and Jerven (2014b). 
 
 
Table 2: Real wage in African countries, 1885-1950 (1950=100) 
 
 Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Malawi 
1885  65.7 72.2    
1911 98.0 78.7 84.9 67.1 74.6 68.3 
1926 57.8 90.9 74.5 99.6 120.1 72.0 
1929 70.5 118.0 66.4 74.0 86.4 82.2 
1933 72.5 108.3 59.0 116.3 65.7 153.4 
1938 80.4 108.4 87.8 94.8 78.0 145.3 
1943 73.5 105.8 47.6 76.7 108.9  
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Derived from Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012); Mosley (1983). 
 
 
Table 3: Export volumes in African countries, 1885-1950 (1950=100) 
 
 Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1885  6.0 2.1     
1911 32.3 19.3 19.7 12.5 3.6 0.04 8.3 
1926 37.5 73.0 51.5 69.9 40.2 2.6 31.0 
1929 46.1 74.6 62.3 68.6 45.3 5.5 33.2 
1933 40.7 75.1 59.9 105.8 67.2 41.4 37.3 
1938 65.0 98.2 73.5 132.7 96.5 71.8 73.3 
1943 62.9 73.5 77.9 92.4 45.8 77.6 78.0 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Derived from Blue Books and Trade Reports for each country, listed in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4: 1950 weights of key products in national export volume indicators (%) 
 
 Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
Cocoa  86.0 25.4     
Gold 21.0 13.7      
Palm 
products 
 
0.25 38.4     
Rubber  0.05 3.8    0.1 
Groundnuts   20.4     
Tin   8.0     
Cotton   4.0  70.5  7.3 
Coffee    37.2 29.5   
Tea    14.2   35.1 
Pyrethrum    3.5    
Sisal    42.4    
Maize    0.7    
Wool    2.0    
Blister 
copper 
 
    68.5  
Electrolytic 
copper 
 
    20.8  
Chrome 5.4       
Asbestos 17.0       
Tobacco 56.6     2.2 57.5 
Lead      2.9  
Zinc      5.6  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Derived from Blue Books and Trade Reports for each country, listed in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 5: Real government expenditure in African countries, 1885-1950 (1950=100) 
 
 Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1885  2.6 0.5     
1911 18.9 21.5 31.2 23.0 13.2 6.6 12.2 
1926 23.4 59.1 49.5 38.3 32.1 8.5 17.6 
1929 30.7 44.0 41.5 56.2 40.2 10.5 22.9 
1933 31.6 28.2 34.8 54.5 34.3 15.8 31.6 
1938 42.0 40.0 44.3 60.8 49.5 26.3 44.2 
1943 41.8 35.3 45.3 74.9 36.9 34.6 33.6 
1950 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Derived from nominal government expenditure reported in Blue Books for each 
country, listed in Appendix 1, deflated by the UK price index for government expenditure from 
Feinstein (1972). 
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Table 6: Economic structure of African countries, circa 1950 (% of value added)  
 
 Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
Trad 
agriculture 
 
24.3 54.6 24.2 46.3  40.5 
Domestic 
ind/serv 
 
39.6 24.0 47.3 27.9  40.7 
Traditional 
sector 
64.6 
    54.6  
Export sector 28.1 24.1 12.3 14.2 23.3 37.7 9.0 
Government 7.3 12.0 9.0 6.0 2.5 7.7 9.8 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Derived from national accounting sources for each country, listed in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 7: Average annual rates of GDP growth in African countries, 1966-1995 
 
 Official 
series 
Maddison PWT WDI 
Botswana 11.5 10.9 9.8 11.2 
Kenya 5.2 4.7 5.0 5.3 
Tanzania 3.7 3.2 3.4 n.a. 
Zambia 0.9 1.1 1.6 0.9 
 
Source: derived from Jerven (2014a: 50-51). 
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Table 8: Average rate of change of per capita income in growing years and 
shrinking years in Africa and the United Kingdom, 1885-2008 (% per annum) 
 
  1885-1910 1926-1938 1950-1980 1980-2008 
South 
Africa 
     
 Growing 10.49 7.92 2.37 2.15 
 Shrinking -11.06 -4.37 -0.89 -2.53 
Zimbabwe      
 Growing  6.75 4.50 4.26 
 Shrinking  -2.93 -2.86 -4.70 
Ghana      
 Growing 3.47 15.30 4.08 2.28 
 Shrinking -2.15 -9.72 -4.44 -7.17 
Nigeria      
 Growing 5.07  5.28 3.33 
 Shrinking -6.38  -6.20 -3.73 
Kenya      
 Growing  15.19 3.73 1.93 
 Shrinking  -19.74 -4.28 -1.89 
Uganda      
 Growing  5.98 3.09 3.32 
 Shrinking  -7.03 -3.85 -3.95 
Zambia      
 Growing  5.59 5.70 3.08 
 Shrinking  -1.40 -4.23 -4.73 
Malawi      
 Growing  10.37 3.75 3.88 
 Shrinking  -2.40 -2.83 -4.49 
UK      
 Growing 2.54 3.07 2.67 2.56 
 Shrinking -1.69 -3.43 -0.88 -1.09 
 
Sources: Derived from Appendix 1 and Maddison (2010). 
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Table 9: Frequency of growing and shrinking of GDP per capita in Africa and the 
United Kingdom, 1885-2008 
 
  1885-1910 1926-1938 1950-1980 1980-2008 
South 
Africa 
     
 Growing 0.64 0.58 0.83 0.61 
 Shrinking 0.36 0.42 0.17 0.39 
Zimbabwe      
 Growing  0.50 0.67 0.32 
 Shrinking  0.50 0.33 0.68 
Ghana      
 Growing 0.52 0.42 0.53 0.89 
 Shrinking 0.48 0.58 0.47 0.11 
Nigeria      
 Growing 0.60  0.70 0.61 
 Shrinking 0.40  0.30 0.39 
Kenya      
 Growing  0.58 0.73 0.54 
 Shrinking  0.42 0.27 0.46 
Uganda      
 Growing  0.50 0.47 0.82 
 Shrinking  0.50 0.53 0.18 
Zambia      
 Growing  0.75 0.53 0.57 
 Shrinking  0.25 0.47 0.43 
Malawi      
 Growing  0.50 0.77 0.61 
 Shrinking  0.50 0.23 0.39 
UK      
 Growing 0.64 0.83 0.83 0.89 
 Shrinking 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.11 
 
Sources: Derived from Appendix 1 and Maddison (2010). 
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Table 10: Contributions of growing (frequency*rate) and shrinking 
(frequency*rate) to long run economic performance (average rate of change of per 
capita income in all years) in Africa and the United Kingdom, 1885-2008 
 
  1885-1910 1926-1938 1950-1980 1980-2008 
South 
Africa 
All years 2.73 2.80 1.83 0.31 
 Growing 6.71 4.62 1.98 1.31 
 Shrinking -3.98 -1.82 -0.15 -0.99 
Zimbabwe All years  1.91 2.05 -1.82 
 Growing  3.37 3.00 1.37 
 Shrinking  -1.47 -0.95 -3.19 
Ghana All years 0.77 0.70 0.10 1.27 
 Growing 1.80 6.37 2.17 2.04 
 Shrinking -1.03 -5.67 -2.07 -0.77 
Nigeria All years 0.49  1.83 0.55 
 Growing 3.04  3.69 2.02 
 Shrinking -2.55  -1.86 -1.46 
Kenya All years  0.64 1.60 0.16 
 Growing  8.86 2.74 1.04 
 Shrinking  -8.23 -1.14 -0.88 
Uganda All years  -0.53 -0.61 2.02 
 Growing  2.99 1.44 2.73 
 Shrinking  -3.52 -2.05 -0.70 
Zambia All years  3.84 1.07 -0.27 
 Growing  4.19 3.04 1.76 
 Shrinking  -0.35 -1.97 -2.03 
Malawi All years  3.98 2.22 0.59 
 Growing  5.18 2.88 2.36 
 Shrinking  -1.20 -0.66 -1.76 
UK All years 1.02 1.99 2.07 2.17 
 Growing 1.63 2.56 2.22 2.29 
 Shrinking -0.61 -0.57 -0.15 -0.12 
 
Sources: Derived from Appendix 1 and Maddison (2010). 
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP in Cape Colony, 1701-1910 and South Africa, 1910-
2008 (1990 international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Source: Fourie and van Zanden (2013). 
 
 
Figure 2: Per capita GDP in Southern Africa, 1885-2008 (1990 international 
dollars, log scale) 
 
 
Sources: See Appendices 1 and 2. 
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Figure 3: Per capita GDP in West Africa compared with South Africa, 1885-2008 
(1990 international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 4: Per capita GDP in East Africa compared with South Africa, 1885-2008 
(1990 international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendices 1 and 2. 
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Figure 5: Per capita GDP in Central Africa compared with South Africa, 1885-
2008 (1990 international dollars, log scale) 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 6: GDP per capita in leading African economies as a percentage of the UK 
level 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendices 1 and 2. 
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Appendix 3: Annual GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 1885-2008 (1990 
international dollars) 
 
 
S 
Africa Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1885 582  658 547     
1886 687  648 552     
1887 784  649 506     
1888 884  666 506     
1889 875  664 539     
1890 881  671 505     
1891 918  732 601     
1892 895  687 568     
1893 887  696 588     
1894 862  786 669     
1895 993  731 700     
1896 1,037  726 699     
1897 970  734 631     
1898 1,164  731 681     
1899 1,022  724 719     
1900 642  729 730     
1901 774  708 725     
1902 924  714 638     
1903 1,238  774 645     
1904 1,238  833 677 540   300 
1905 1,321  809 684 452   298 
1906 1,426  812 675 449 446 365 294 
1907 1,400  817 676 453 406 366 296 
1908 1,099  816 674 477 376 365 301 
1909 1,151  814 736 480  365 313 
1910 1,151  798 618 611 395 365 301 
1911   811 629 501 393 366 302 
1912    630 489 385 366 302 
1913     502 379 367 374 
1914  914  636   368  
1915    586   371 364 
1916       374  
1917       372 291 
1918 1,163       264 
1919  609  353    256 
1920  431 759 590    249 
1921  419 913 548    244 
1922  512 960 526    246 
1923  588 1,093 418   381 266 
1924 1,278 513 1,138 515   373 298 
1925 1,362 507 1,127 525   374 320 
1926 1,398 567 1,147 625 754 622 377 271 
1927 1,425 640 1,140 524 886 580 389 297 
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Appendix 3: Annual GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 1885-2008 (1990 
international dollars) 
 
 S Africa Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1928 1,533 683 970 566 773 555 391 295 
1929 1,497 645 1,279 582 577 526 387 294 
1930 1,413 623 1,204 536 752 477 390 296 
1931 1,335 638 1,427 559 802 480 388 408 
1932 1,284 704 1,233  822 473 461 401 
1933 1,423 686 1,201 552 940 498 507 457 
1934 1,577 666 1,222 570 797 433 538 414 
1935 1,747 665 1,217 579 731 508 524 410 
1936 1,912 696 1,484 684 959 543 532 440 
1937 2,038 677 1,127 697 706 556 582 442 
1938 1,956 713 1,248 703 814 584 597 437 
1939 2,053 806 1,269 655   584 429 
1940 2,145   538   638 428 
1941 2,202    758 657 576 423 
1942 2,226  1,137 616 789 620 580  
1943 2,232  1,150 498 625 573 600  
1944 2,265 659 1,113  916 515 593  
1945 2,278 672 1,105  848 505 542  
1946 2,311 599     543  
1947 2,288 594     564  
1948 2,414 615 1,279    592 271 
1949 2,396 629 1,172   579 628 303 
1950 2,535 701 1,122 753 651 687 661 324 
1951 2,591 722 1,134 792 771 642 688 332 
1952 2,619 724 1,084 830 667 664 715 339 
1953 2,675 760 1,202 831 633 675 743 347 
1954 2,763 772 1,317 867 687 648 772 355 
1955 2,830 808 1,200 865 718 672 736 354 
1956 2,914 892 1,236 821 736 690 803 376 
1957 2,951 924 1,241 830 738 700 817 383 
1958 2,939 906 1,187 797 725 685 776 388 
1959 2,995 925 1,321 808 720 700 915 393 
1960 3,042 938 1,378 820 726 713 960 394 
1961 3,092 956 1,388 824 686 686 938 404 
1962 3,179 939 1,416 846 701 694 905 393 
1963 3,321 901 1,424 899 714 751 902 376 
1964 3,450 953 1,414 910 758 785 996 359 
1965 3,559 984 1,393 944 743 779 1,147 397 
1966 3,615 967 1,354 887 812 803 1,056 426 
1967 3,760 1,015 1,339 728 826 822 1,107 455 
1968 3,819 999 1,318 699 857 818 1,092 437 
1969 3,946 1,086 1,325 861 881 881 1,056 453 
1970 4,045 1,282 1,424 1,094 915 867 1,073 447 
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Appendix 3: Annual GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 1885-2008 (1990 
international dollars) 
 
 
S 
Africa Zimbabwe Ghana Nigeria Kenya Uganda Zambia Malawi 
1971 4,135 1,353 1,491 1,188 941 869 1,042 498 
1972 4,109 1,423 1,402 1,197 956 856 1,105 534 
1973 4,175 1,432 1,397 1,262 970 835 1,062 562 
1974 4,299 1,427 1,455 1,367 981 817 1,114 582 
1975 4,271 1,402 1,247 1,287 942 780 1,041 586 
1976 4,267 1,357 1,178 1,385 943 765 1,071 591 
1977 4,155 1,221 1,181 1,393 991 757 990 603 
1978 4,174 1,232 1,260 1,272 1,039 697 967 637 
1979 4,232 1,211 1,210 1,320 1,036 606 910 646 
1980 4,390 1,295 1,157 1,305 1,051 572 911 630 
1981 4,481 1,407 1,142 1,164 1,033 579 936 580 
1982 4,323 1,405 1,042 1,119 1,054 610 877 567 
1983 4,112 1,374 933 1,023 1,021 636 828 573 
1984 4,186 1,297 960 958 1,000 563 796 580 
1985 4,007 1,335 978 1,017 1,006 556 784 606 
1986 3,912 1,322 988 1,010 1,040 538 762 587 
1987 3,897 1,257 1,007 976 1,065 550 755 568 
1988 3,964 1,326 1,034 1,046 1,092 566 777 547 
1989 3,956 1,368 1,057 1,085 1,105 583 762 542 
1990 3,834 1,355 1,062 1,112 1,117 585 806 540 
1991 3,716 1,391 1,087 1,149 1,097 570 783 564 
1992 3,566 1,233 1,099 1,150 1,049 567 749 504 
1993 3,534 1,220 1,119 1,146 1,021 593 779 543 
1994 3,584 1,278 1,122 1,111 1,023 609 658 496 
1995 3,646 1,272 1,141 1,113 1,042 663 627 582 
1996 3,752 1,385 1,168 1,156 1,059 701 653 611 
1997 3,801 1,403 1,192 1,161 1,056 716 660 618 
1998 3,777 1,427 1,221 1,154 1,049 728 633 622 
1999 3,808 1,401 1,247 1,139 1,038 759 632 631 
2000 3,890 1,320 1,265 1,161 1,013 773 640 639 
2001 3,950 1,279 1,289 1,170 998 787 656 599 
2002 4,048 1,203 1,317 1,161 982 815 665 597 
2003 4,130 1,082 1,354 1,258 983 823 689 607 
2004 4,156 1,048 1,400 1,305 1,000 835 715 623 
2005 4,316 1,015 1,452 1,346 1,030 856 742 628 
2006 4,503 958 1,514 1,400 1,066 916 776 655 
2007 4,689 900 1,568 1,468 1,110 958 812 694 
2008 4,793 779 1,650 1,524 1,098 1,008 845 744 
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